While hosting the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Washington on Wednesday and at Camp David on Thursday, President Barack Obama faces a hard sell: assuring the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia that the United States has an Iran policy that encompasses their security needs.
He must also encourage the six GCC countries to work together for their own collective security, but in a way that dovetails with America’s own strategic goals.
But doing so won’t be easy. Only three of the six GCC nations are sending heads of state. The leaders of Oman and the UAE pleaded health issues as their excuses to stay home; Saudi Arabia says its ruler, King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud, won’t be traveling due to humanitarian commitments to Yemen. The Saudi snub in particular reflects the concern, among America’s Sunni Arab allies, that the U.S. isn’t taking a hard enough stance toward Iran and its proxies.
The Saudis’ commitment to ensuring that the U.S. is ready to oppose Iranian-proxy forces even as rapprochement moves forward is clearly seen in Yemen. After tamping down the Arab Spring in Sanaa and easing a sympathetic government into power with Saudi support, America militarized Yemen.
This approach was intended to be a model for a new “small footprint” strategy, where a compliant local government would be paired with drones and special forces to conduct joint strikes against Islamic militants fueled by intelligence from the U.S.
The president cited Yemen as a successful example of this strategy as recently as September 2014.
Yet the dissolution of that country, and the chaos that followed a tail-between-the-legs evacuation of American diplomats and special forces, instead planted an Iranian-supported rebellion on Saudi Arabia’s border.
When Washington did not decisively move to counter Iranian gains in Yemen, the Saudis lashed out in late March of this year. The recent Saudi royal succession, which concentrated power in a smaller circle, may have also put pressure on the new king to act aggressively. Though the Saudi attacks in Yemen are tactically aimed at securing its southern border, strategically they send a message to Iran to step back.
They signal to the U.S. that Saudi Arabia wants Washington to become more engaged in the situation and perhaps use airstrikes and covert forces, similar to what it is doing in other parts of the Middle East.
Increasing hostilities, including the Saudi use of American-supplied cluster bombs, forced Obama into that rock-and-a-hard-place that increasingly defines Washington’s policy in the region. He needed to ensure Saudi military action did not bleed over into open conflict with Iran, while demonstrating the U.S. would stand up for its allies. Obama’s tepid answer — saber-rattling in the form of an aircraft carrier moved into the area — seemed to back down the Iranians for now but said very little about long-term strategy.
The Saudis demonstrated in Yemen what might be called unilateral collective defense; though they could not assemble a robust pan-Arab force and have conducted most of the bombing themselves, they acted with regional assistance in the form of limited airstrikes, reconnaissance help and statements of support.
This is very much at odds with Washington’s idea of what pan-Arab collective defense should look like. After all, how far can relations with Iran progress — never mind the goal of regional stability — when America’s allies start new wars against Iranian proxies?
No matter who shows up for this week’s conference, Obama will propose his own version of collective defense, a regional missile defense system. This will be a significant step down from the NATO-like agreement with the U.S. the GCC would prefer. (Stated plans to create an “Arab NATO” are still in process.) Obama’s offer will likely include new arms sales to GCC states that, while afraid of Iran, still remain wary of one another.
The U.S. wants to be the glue that holds the arrangement together. That would seem to be an optimistic goal since American glue failed to hold together any substantive pan-Arab force in Iraq and Syria, and tens of billions of dollars in arms sales over the years apparently have not been reassuring enough.
If Washington doesn’t reassure the GCC countries that it will oppose Iran in proxy wars across the region, expect more independent action from America’s allies in the Persian Gulf. America can’t walk away from these countries; oil, long-standing alliances and U.S. strategic facilities and bases housed across the GCC are factors.
This may lead to Washington finding itself dragged into any number of fights it doesn’t want, or stuck playing intermediary between the Saudis and Iran, as it is now doing to help broker a short cease-fire in Yemen. Think Syria next, where the Saudis are already working on a deal with Turkey that is at odds with American policy.
Obama and the GCC nations are likely to conclude this week’s meetings with little resolved, even as all sides know they must ideally find some resolution ahead of the June 30 deadline for the U.S.-Iran nuclear treaty.
The old order is in flux. Iran is no doubt watching traditional allies snap at each other over its ascendancy with some satisfaction; discord only plays to its advantage. All three sides — the U.S., the GCC and the Iranians — are watching the clock. What will be their next moves if time runs out?